We show that every NP relation that can be verified by a bounded-depth polynomial-sized circuit, or a bounded-space polynomial-time algorithm, has a computational zero-knowledge proof (with statistical soundness) with communication that is only additively larger than the witness length. Our construction relies only on the minimal assumption that one-way functions exist. In more detail, assuming one-way functions, we show that every NP relation that can be verified in NC has a zero-knowledge proof with communication $|w|+poly(\lambda,\log(|x|))$ and relations that can be verified in SC have a zero-knowledge proof with communication $|w|+|x|^\epsilon \cdot poly(\lambda)$. Here $\epsilon>0$ is an arbitrarily small constant and \lambda denotes the security parameter. As an immediate corollary, we also get that any NP relation, with a size S verification circuit (using unbounded fan-in XOR, AND and OR gates), has a zero-knowledge proof with communication $S+poly(\lambda,\log(S))$.
Our result improves on a recent result of Nassar and Rothblum (Crypto, 2022), which achieve length $(1+\epsilon) \cdot |w|+|x|^\epsilon \cdot poly(\lambda)$ for bounded-space computations, and is also considerably simpler. Building on a work of Hazay et al. (TCC 2023), we also give a more complicated version of our result in which the parties only make a black-box use of the one-way function, but in this case we achieve only an inverse polynomial soundness error.
* Based on joint work with Eden Florentz – Konopnicki and Ron Rothblum.
